Created with the aim of replacing social energy tariffs, the energy voucher aims to combat the effects of fuel poverty by offering low-income households assistance in paying their energy bills. In the report published today, the Court of Auditors draws up a series of observations which seem to it to justify the conduct of a reflection on the real nature of the system: in this sense, it notes in particular that the only criterion retained by the public authorities - the standard of living of household members - makes its targeting ineffective. In addition, the fact that the check can finance any type of energy goes against France's climate objectives, since it ends up subsidizing the use of carbon and decarbonized energies in the same way. Beyond a parametric evolution of the energy check and the strengthening of its coherence, the Court proposes three possible scenarios, depending on a clarification of the objectives pursued.
The existing system could be simplified and improved to maintain its social vocation and make it more accessible
In the current system, the income brackets forming the scale of the check do not take into account the multi-annual evolution of the level of wages in France, which entails a risk of a mechanical reduction in the number of households falling under the first brackets (and receiving a check for a higher amount). Furthermore, the rate of use (80%) seems to have reached a ceiling, despite the promotional efforts of the public authorities and their partners. The Court also notes that the information relating to the beneficiaries remains incomplete, whether it concerns their socio-demographic characteristics, the other social aid they receive, their energy consumption or the use they make of the energy voucher. Finally, the possibility of using the energy voucher to finance energy renovation work did not have the expected success, with less than 900 beneficiaries per campaign.
The ASP manages the system correctly but must be more actively involved in generating management savings
Under the leadership of the Ministry for Ecological Transition, the system is managed by the Services and Payment Agency (ASP), which is directly responsible for part of its operational implementation. While the number of beneficiaries has increased considerably since the creation of the energy voucher, the Court emphasizes that the ASP has been able to adapt to the many changes by developing new tools and services (dematerialization, pre-assignment, etc.), and by strengthening user assistance. With regard to budget management, on the other hand, it was less satisfactory during the first years of the existence of the energy voucher. The stabilization of the system should make it possible to generate savings greater than those currently observed.
The choice of a simple criterion for its allocation has the effect of imprecise targeting of beneficiaries
If the current system is working properly, its coherence vis-à-vis its pursued objectives raises questions. By using the effort ratio (the share of income devoted to domestic energy expenditure) as a criterion for measuring fuel poverty, it appears that approximately 25% of households in a situation of fuel poverty do not receive the energy voucher. Conversely, about half of the households that receive it do not meet the conditions to be considered as being in a situation of fuel poverty. In addition, its amount is too low to make it possible to fight effectively against this precariousness, and relegates its function to that of social aid to support the purchasing power of households with the lowest standard of living. The Government's decision, in September 2021, to award all its beneficiaries an exceptional uniform check of €100 reinforces this trend. Finally, the fact that the check can finance any type of energy (carbon and carbon-free) goes against France's climate objectives.
The clarification of the objectives could guide the overhaul of this system
For the Court, these findings could justify initiating a reflection on the real nature of the energy check in order to strengthen its consistency. With this in mind, it suggests that the legislator choose between the following three scenarios: making this aid free of use by households, supporting the maintenance of the current system with an increase in carbon taxation, or targeting only households in a situation fuel poverty - which would make it possible to increase the amount of aid at a constant overall cost.